History Of The British Raj History ..
Higher history british democracy essay - …
The German army suffered from two important strategic difficulties. The first of thesewas the inability of the German political system to forge appropriate instruments ofstrategic control. The second was Great Britain. German government rested on the torturedpersonality of the Kaiser. It was riven by intrigue and indecision. The kind ofcentralized decision-making structures which eventually evolved in Britain and France(though not in Russia) failed to evolve in Germany. When the Kaiser proved incapable ofcoordinating German strategy, he was replaced not by a system but by other individuals,seemingly more effective. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg radiated calm and inspiredconfidence. This gave him the appearance of a great man but without the substance. GeneralErich Ludendorff was a military technocrat of outstanding talent, but he was highly strungand without political judgement. In 1918 his offensive strategy brought Germany to ruin.
Higher british essay history democracy
The failure of the Schlieffen Plan gave the First World War its essential shape. Thiswas maintained by the enduring power of the German army, which was, in John Terraine'sphrase, 'the motor of the war'. The German army was a potent instrument. It had played ahistoric role in the emergence of the German state. It enjoyed enormous prestige. It wasable to recruit men of talent and dedication as officers and NCOs. As a result it was welltrained and well led. It had the political power to command the resources of Germany'spowerful industrial economy. Germany's position at the heart of Europe meant that it couldoperate on interior lines of communication in a European war. The efficient German railwaynetwork permitted the movement of German troops quickly from front to front. The superiorspeed of the locomotive over the ship frustrated Allied attempts to use their command ofthe sea to operate effectively against the periphery of the Central Powers. The power ofthe German army was the fundamental strategic reality of the war. 'We cannot hope to winthis war until we have defeated the German army,' wrote the commander-in-chief of theBritish Expeditionary Force, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. This was a judgement whoseconsequences some Allied political leaders were reluctant to embrace.