SparkNotes: Genealogy of Morals: Third Essay, Sections …

Critics of Nietzsche must contend with a philosopher who sometimes shows little desire to substantiate his claims; who approaches philosophical problems with the psychologist’s view (why do people think this way?) rather than the logician’s (does the conclusion follow from the premises?); who appeals equally to our intuition and our counter-intuition (he assumes that we concur that most of our moral assumptions are fundamentally misguided, and so we naturally want to explore and even embrace the opposite view); who assumes that we either see or can be convinced to see the same general traits that he sees in the Europe of his day. When we keep in mind that Nietzsche overtly addressed his writings to “free spirits,” the philosophers of the future, and even future Übermensch, the obscurity of Nietzsche during his own lifetime becomes understandable.

Nietzsche On The Genealogy Of Morals Essay 3

He is known for his works on genealogy of morality, which is a way to study values and concepts.

Nietzsche Essay - Genealogy of Morals Book 3 and …

Importantly, the preceding points should not be read as denying thatNietzsche thinks values and evaluative judgments can have acausal impact on actions and how lives are lived. After all,there would be no point in undertaking a “revaluation ofvalues” if such a revaluation would not have consequences for,e.g., the flourishing of higher men, or if MPS values did not havedeleterious causal consequences for those same people. Values make acausal difference, but, given Nietzsche's epiphenomenalismabout consciousness (discussed, above, in 1.1), they do not make thisdifference because of free, conscious choices individuals make toadopt certain moral rules or cultivate certain dispositions ofcharacter.

Nietzsche: Genealogy of Morals: Third Essay

If “the men of great creativity, the really great menaccording to my understanding” (WP 957), men like Goethe andBeethoven, are Nietzsche's paradigmatic higher types, whose lives aremodels of flourishing excellence, is there anything systematic to besaid about the theory of value that undergirds these judgments andinforms, in turn, Nietzsche's critique of morality (MPS) on the groundsthat it thwarts the development of such men?

In Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche mentions that values and concepts have a history because of the many different meanings that come with it.
Rée, like all English genealogists of morality, sees as the veryessence of moral evaluation); similarly, p.

This is a summary/commentary on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality

Having avowedly freed himself from the standards of Truth and logic, Nietzsche’s work appears more as rhetoric, in the benighted sense of the Sophists–an attempt to convince us through appeals to our intuition. Nietzsche’s fighting ground almost always becomes psychology–or psychologically compelling portraits of the principal players in the formation of morality: the natural aristocracy; the ascetic priest; the early philosophers; the ancient Greeks; Wagner, etc. A fundamental charge that can be levied against Nietzsche, however, is that his appeals to our intuition are in actuality appeals to our cynicism. The persuasiveness of his method, one of rhetoric and psychology instead of systems or appeals to deductive logic, must be determined by individual readers.

I felt it was only proper to open the commentary with one of Nietzsche’s many famous quotes from On the Genealogy of Morality.

Nietzsche genealogy of morals essay 3 paragraph - …

It is not quite clear to me what Nietzsche'smorality is, but he certainly is not rejecting the idea of morality inthe broadest sense of the word (this we know, for example, because heaccepts that there can be purpose, and some morals follow directlyfrom any purpose).

Friedrich Nietzsche was a philologist, who used his knowledge of words to trace the origins of morality from their ancient definitions....

Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886 Towards a Genealogy of Morals ..

Notice, now, that the same type of argument seems to capture whatthe N-Realist construal of Nietzsche has in mind. That is, to get theN-Realist Nietzschean conclusion that what is valuable is power, take(P) and plug in a strong form of Nietzsche's descriptive doctrine ofthe will to power — the doctrine, roughly, that all personsintrinsically ‘desire’ only power. If (P) is valid, ValueNihilism false, and the descriptive doctrine of the will to power istrue, then the normative conclusion about power, which Schacht isafter, seems to follow. (Note, of course, that the Millian Modelargument as formulated so far would show only that power is what isnon-morally valuable or good for an agent. Of course, if the MillianModel argument for prudential value or non-moral goodness doesnot work, then that provides a very strong (if defeasible)reason for supposing that there is no further argument for the relatedaccount of non-prudential value as consisting in maximization ofpower.)